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Politics, Kinship, and Ecology in Southeast Persia
Abstract

The Iranian plateau is an ideal area for investigating the relationship be? tween ecological and sociological
factors because of its stark aridity, on the one hand, and its historical role as a meeting place of ethnic and
cultural movements on the other. The part of the plateau which forms the southeast corner of Persia is
particularly interesting from this point of view. Over an area of some 200,000 square kilometers the great
majority of the population, which numbers about half a million and includes both peasants and nomads, call
themselves Baluch. Most, but not all of them, speak a dialect of Baluchi as their native tongue, and practically
all adults speak it as a lingua franca. However, their political and social organization shows important
variations, and there are striking geographical variations in the country they inhabit. It is unusual to find such
wide variations among people who consider themselves one society. This paper shows how the variations in
political and social organization in the area may be related to variations in human ecology. I wish to
demonstrate that in this area of Persia, where political leadership relies on an income from settled agriculture,
there is a definite social differentiation into classes and cognatic values are given to kin relationships, whereas
leadership which relies primarily on nomadic pastoralism works through a structure of agnatic kin
relationships without class differentiation.
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The Iranian plateau is an ideal area for investigating the relationship be?
tween ecological and sociological factors because of its stark aridity, on

the one hand, and its historical role as a meeting place of ethnic and

cultural movements on the other. The part of the plateau which forms the
southeast corner of Persia is particularly interesting from this point of view.

Over an area of some 200,000 square kilometers the great majority of the
population, which numbers about half a million and includes both peasants
and nomads, call themselves Baluch. Most, but not all of them, speak a
dialect of Baluchi as their native tongue, and practically all adults speak
it as a lingua franca. However, their political and social organization shows
important variations, and there are striking geographical variations in the
country they inhabit. It is unusual to find such wide variations among people

who consider themselves one society. This paper shows how the variations
in political and social organization in the area may be related to variations
in human ecology. I wish to demonstrate that in this area of Persia, where
political leadership relies on an income from settled agriculture, there is a
definite social differentiation into classes and cognatic values are given
to kin relationships, whereas leadership which relies primarily on nomadic
pastoralism works through a structure of agnatic kin relationships without
class differentiation.1

The first section of the paper describes briefly the more significant
aspects of the political and social organization, the differences in behavior
relating to kinship, and the more important ecological factors. I also in?
dicate the structural relationship between communities following different
practices. The second section introduces two special cases which illustrate
partial transitions between the two poles of structural variation. The final
section seeks, by means of a diachronic model based on historical recon?
struction, to show the dynamic relationship between the various differences

in practice. The material, and to some extent the argument, is complicated
by the fact that beginning in 1928 the central government has followed a
formal policy of substituting its own administration for the traditional
political organization. Until about fifteen years ago the effects of this policy

seem to have been minimal, but during the last decade or so traditional

Baluch leaders have lost most of their freedom of action.
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General Ethnography

The most conscious sociological divisions among the Persian Balu
into tribes (zat), which are in many cases subdivided. Membershi
tribe is inherited patrilineally. A more significant?though less con
sociological division is into social categories, which, since they are t
factor in determining status, may be called classes. There is no wo
class in Baluchi, only names for each social category, namely, ha\o

baluch? shahri, and gholam. Secondary status or subclass distinctions ar

made within these four broad classes, usually on the basis of trib
subtribe. Class membership is also hereditary, but according to b

principles, and in cases of mixed parentage the lowest common denomi

prevails. There are some cases where a tribe which is baluch or sha
class has a subtribe descended from it which has become ha\omz

apart from this possibility tribes do not overlap classes.

A complication in the analysis of these class categories is that in
baluch and shahri cannot be said to stand in a hierarchical relation
any given community or area all the baluch may have a higher s

rating than all the shahri, or vice versa, but it is more usual for some

shahri tribes or subtribes to have a higher and some a lower statu

than the baluch of the area. In general, there is a wide status differen
within the shahri class but much less differentiation within the baluch
class.

These terms signify basically occupational divisions, or divisions accord?
ing to way of life and livelihood. The hdhpmzat class comprises all of a
certain type of chief (ha\om) and their more immediate families. The
baluch are nomadic pastoralists. The shahri are peasants?always possess?
ing a certain amount of land and/or water, though often not enough to
insure economic independence. The gholam were formerly slaves,3 and
may now be generally characterized as a low social class with no property,
usually distinguishable by their darker skin color. This situation obviously
shows much resemblance to the caste system of the Indian subcontinent,
and a similar situation in Swat has been directly compared to the caste
system (Barth 1962). In our area, however, the situation is less conscious,
and its justification is historical precedent rather than ritual or religious
doctrine. Wherever possible, class difference and individual identity are
expressed in tribal terms. But a tribe is often not a political or social
unit. It may be spread through a number of villages or nomadic groups
over a large area. Similarly, any one peasant community may be com?
posed of members of one or many tribes, and of one or more classes,
and a nomadic area controlled by one high-status family may contain
groups from tribes which extend through several other areas. Conditions
can occur whereby individuals or subtribes change their subclass, or even
their class, over a period of time, but this is rare. Intermarriage?at least

between the three higher classes?is not so rare, though a girl should
never marry down, and it is unheard of for a ha\omzdt girl to marry

outside her class.
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The preferred marriage partner is a cousin, real or classificatory. People

invariably claim to prefer the patrilateral parallel cousin when asked

specifically, but practice shows no definite preference. The terminology
distinguishes only between cousins born of aunts and cousins born of
uncles, and makes no distinction at all between patrilateral and matri?

lateral relatives. It is of the Eskimo type and is identical for all who
speak Baluchi within the area. However, some tribes follow a strict

patrilineal reckoning of descent, give no inheritance to daughters, and
ascribe little importance to the origin of the mother, whereas others

reckon descent bilaterally, give equal inheritance shares to sons and

daughters, and ascribe equal importance to the origin of the mother.4
Where the father is an important leader and it is likely that the eldest
son will take his place, it is usual for the father to set aside an extra portion

for him before the general division of the inheritance. This must be

done with the consent of the other sons and daughters, and is known
as mirwandi, which may be roughly translated as the "leadership share."
Such leaders, even though their kinship practice may be entirely cognatic,
always remember their agnatic genealogy back to the ancestor who brought
the family into the area. This is considered a factor contributing to the
legitimacy of a leader's authority.

The highest position of political authority was that of ha\om. A ha\om

was a member of the hakpmzat class who controlled an agricultural

center. The term was in origin usurped from the Persian administration

before the end of the last century?possibly much earlier?and meant
"governor." It is now strictly speaking obsolete, because the government

no longer allows any formal recognition of the chiefs' status, but it
continues to be used colloquially. Although the position depended to a

large extent on the possession of certain personal qualities, it was inherited
ideally, though by no means always in fact, by the eldest son from a wife
of the same zat or, failing that, from the same class. Before the Persian
government took over the effective administration of the area, each hakpm
had a fort in the main agricultural center under his control. His income

depended more on what he could control than on what he owned. It

consisted of:

(1) The produce of land personally owned by him. This was worked by

his own gholam, who received their keep, and/or sometimes local
shahri who took a share of the harvest or some other compensation

such as use of the ha\om\ water for their own land.

(2) A tithe {dah-yal() on all agricultural produce of the shahri whom

he controlled. These included all those in his center and those in a
hinterland which varied according to his strength and prestige.

(3) Service {sren-bandi) from all baluch who acknowledged his position.
This could take many forms, as required, but was generally military o

quasi-military.

(4) A tax {maliyat) from both shahri and baluch. This was in origin

the tax due to the central government, but it was usurped by the ha\om

with the title.
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The ha\om no longer, of course, has any legal right to the last three

of these items any more than to the title, but the concepts are still

valid and the practices are still occasionally found. In particular, within
the conceptual framework of sren-bandi, the baluch are always ready to
carry messages or run errands for the hd\om. It is evident from the
foregoing list that the hd\om relied basically on a subject peasant popula?
tion for their income, and on allegiance from nomadic pastoralists for
their physical strength.

Not all communities, however, were involved with hd\om, and some
were involved only indirectly. Another type of leader is called sarddr.
No class distinction exists between a sarddr and his following. He is always
therefore either a shahri or a baluch, and thus by definition a class below

a hahpm? He is ideally the senior member of the senior family of a

tribe or group of subtribes, or in some cases of a community including
representatives of different tribes. Where the tribe or community led by
a sarddr also owed allegiance to a hd\om, as in perhaps the majority of

cases, the ha\om would confirm the appointment of the sarddr by
"tying on the turban," and in some cases he was able to influence

the decision between rival candidates. Ideally the position of sarddr is
inherited in a similar manner to that of hd\om, and personal qualities
are an important factor in both cases. The qualification of descent on the
mother's side is probably less important for the sarddr than for the
hd\om, but this is difficult to confirm since there is less polygyny in
sarddr families, and where it occurs there is less class difference between
wives of a sarddr than between those of a ha\om.
There are also communities which have no connection with either a

hd\om or a sarddr and are led by a \amash. Whereas the term hd\om
is an Arabic word adopted from Persian during the last century, and
sarddr came from Persian probably not very much earlier, \amdsh comes
from Brahui?a language of the Dravidian family, still spoken by minor?
ity groups, which almost certainly preceded Baluchi in the area. Originally
it meant "greybeard." Now it has both an absolute and a relative usage.
The politically senior man in any group, whether temporary or permanent,

is referred to as the \amash of that group. Otherwise a \amash is any
man who has the means and personal qualities to take on the responsibility
of informal political representation for any number of other people, and
in this sense the term may also be applied to sarddr, hdkpm, and certain
religious figures who seek to wield temporal authority. All men require

the political representation of a \amdsh, who may be dependent on a

sarddr, or on a hdhpm, or in certain rare cases may maintain freedom of
action and be the paramount authority in a small area. A sarddr may be

independent, or dependent on a hd\om.

As a general rule, it may be said that people of the shahri and

hdkpmzdt classes are invariably cognatic, and that all baluch communities

which have a traditional relationship with a hd\om also tend to be

cognatically organized, whereas baluch tribes which have remained in?
dependent of hd\om are patrilineal.
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The basic means of livelihood, or subsistence techniques, in Persian Baluchistan vary between agriculture and pastoralism. But there is also a varia?
tion in the main domestic animal relied on (usually the camel or the goat), in

staple crops (wheat, dates, rice, sorghum, beans), and in methods of irriga?
tion. The variation in types of environment is even greater; for instance, the

highest peak in the area has an elevation of more than 13,000 feet, whereas
the lowest plains are at sea level. For the purposes of this article, however,
the whole range of variation in environment and human ecology can be
accounted for by applying the following three parameters: (1) the availabil?
ity of water for agricultural use; (2) the level of technology at the command
of the people who would use this water; (3) the coincidence of this water
with cultivable soil.

Throughout the area direct rainfall is of negligible value, but one of the
most important sources of water for irrigation is the run-off and wadi flood-

ing which result from rainfall. The rainfall of a whole catchment basin is
gathered by the nature of the terrain itself, with little or no human assis?
tance, and is directed along with its invaluable sediment on to prepared
fields. However, although a considerable volume of water is thus made
available, the supply is extremely irregular and therefore does not in general

support permanent settlement. In some parts wells are used, operated by
hand by means of counterpoised water-lifts. In places where there is a shallow
water table with a large catchment basin these can be reasonably reliable, but
they nevertheless do not provide enough water to justify permanent agricul?
tural settlement. In the mountain ranges which cross the southern part of the
area many of the larger river beds in places retain flowing water throughout
the year. Several of the agricultural centers of the area lie on such rivers, utilizing the alluvium which the river has deposited in a bend of its course. The
larger settlements invariably contain the ruins of a fort and the residence of a
hd\omzat family.
There is one other method of obtaining water for irrigation which is used

in the area, and this requires a much higher level of technological achieve?
ment than the methods mentioned so far. The Iranian plateau is the home of
the qandt system,6 but there are relatively few qandt in Persian Baluchistan,

and so far as I could ascertain none of them were dug by Baluch. The great
advantage of a good qandt is that, once the capital investment has been made,

the owner commands a continuous and reliable flow of water for irrigation
in return for a relatively small annual outlay on maintenance and repair. A
large proportion of the settled agriculture on the Iranian plateau would have
been impossible (before the introduction of motor pumps) without qandt. In
Persian Baluchistan wherever there are old qandt (with the exception of one
small region?Khash?where the agriculture was for some time controlled by
non-Baluch) a hd\omzdt family is associated with them, and there is con?
sequently class differentiation in the community which lives off them.
In terms of the three parameters, the whole of Persian Baluchistan may be

divided into regions which support a certain amount of settled agriculture
and regions which support only varying numbers of (nomadic) pastoralists.
Traditional settled agriculture is in most cases accompanied by the presence
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or control of a hd\omzat family. One of the best ways of initiating settled
agriculture on any scale in the area is to construct qandt. But qanat are not
constructed by Baluch: Persian experts have to be brought in from the north

or northwest.

Special Cases

Two special cases show partial transitions between the structural var
described above. The first of these concerns the people who call thems
Jadgal and some other closely affiliated tribes which together make u
population of the extreme southeastern corner of Persian Baluchistan
off the plateau on the coastal plain by the Gulf of Oman and the border w
Pakistan. The Jadgal claim to have immigrated from Sind some ten ge
tions ago. Though used by other Baluch as a tribal appellation, the nam
really a collective linguistic term which covers a number of tribes who sp
Jadgali, a language derived from Sindhi (though all male adults are al
lingual in Baluchi). Even though they retain an alien language, they
fully accepted as Baluch and call themselves Baluch in any larger con
The hahpmzdt family of this region is of the same origin but is now clos
intermarried with neighboring ha\omzat families to the north and west,
its leading members no longer speak Jadgali.
The ecology of the region is unique in Persia. The broad, flat plain
composed of layer upon layer of rich alluvial soil, brought down from
mountains by irregular flash floods. The water table is too deep to be acc
ble, even for modern motor pumps, so that regular irrigation is impossib
The people now depend on agriculture (irrigated from irregular flo
water) and animal husbandry to an almost equal degree. Their flock
clude sheep, goats, camels, cows, and water buffaloes, and a number of ho
are still kept for riding purposes. The economy is, therefore, an unus
diversified one.

However, the leading branch of the hd\omzat family now relies entirel
agriculture and no longer has any permanent residential center in the pla
There are two obvious and equally valid reasons for this. First, the rivers
the region have been cutting back rapidly during the last few decades, wi
the result that large areas of land that were previously intensively cultiv
are now left without access to flood water. At the same time, there have

long periods of drought. Second, intermarriage of the leading membe

the hdkpmzat (whose family name is Sardarzai) with neighboring hdhomz

on bilateral principles has provided them with good land in distinct n
boring ecological regions and with a following in these regions, for o

mother's side they now belong to the ruling ha\omzdt families there as w
The Jadgal, exclusive of the Sardarzai, are strictly and exclusively patrilin
Not only do they give no inheritance to daughters, but they regard sonslaw as outsiders and never quite accept them into the in-group. Their susp
cion of in-laws is carried to the extent that they refuse to intermarry w
non-Jadgal.

It appears that the Sardarzai were already differentiated from their peo
when they arrived in the region. After a while, fighting with the previo
inhabitants of the region ended in a settlement and in intermarriage betw
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the leading family of the immigrants and the hdkpmzat of the previous pop?
ulation. The Sardarzai were thus drawn into the cognatic network of ha\omzdt intermarriage which extends today over most of Persian Baluchistan, be?

came automatically members of the hd\omzdt class, and thus gradually im?
ported this class distinction and gave it validity among their own people. At
the same time, because of the cognatic values of the people with whom they

intermarried, they made their own economic (and political) position more
secure by acquiring agricultural property through matrilateral inheritance in
a another ecological region.
The leaders of the Sardarzai family have been conscious of their change to

a cognatic orientation toward kin relationships. The reaction of the present
ha\om and his father has been to attempt to persuade the Jadgal both to
intermarry with the neighboring tribes and to accord inheritance to daugh?
ters?but so far completely without success, even though such a course would

give them shares in a distinct ecological region and to provide them with
some security against drought in their own region. It is unfortunately no
longer possible to judge whether this reaction of the hd\om was due to po?
litical awareness or to subconscious guilt for having deviated from the old
ways. Their present stand is on justice and good. But this is also an im?
ported value, for it is among the Baluch, not among the Jadgal, that there is
a strong, positive brother-sister relationship.

The second case concerns two large regions in Persian Baluchistan which
are peopled by baluch who have remained for the most part aloof and inde?
pendent from any hd\omzdt families, and are led by sardar of their own. One
of these regions provides particularly interesting material in the present con?
text. It is a large depression in the west of the area, generally called Jaz Murian. The main tribe in this region is the Bameri, and for as far back as they
can remember (which is only seven generations, probably marking the date
of their entry into the region) the sardar of the tribe has been a member of
the Nawabi family.
The Bameri claim that when they entered the depression there were no
qandt there. Those which now exist belong exclusively to the Nawabi and,
according to local tradition, were started by that family at about the begin?
ning of this century. Apart from the qandt, a number of districts are culti?
vated by means of hand-operated wells. Whereas the lands irrigated from
qandt belong to the sardar family and are worked by serfs and sharecroppers,
the land irrigated from wells is owned and worked by individual free baluch.
Moreover, generally and ideally land irrigated from wells provides only a
supplementary source of livelihood.
The principal means of livelihood of the baluch of this depression is the
camel; traditionally they have bred and trained what is probably the fastest
and best riding camel in Persia. Since many of the wells are used solely for
the watering of camels, and since even those who use them for cultivation
still rely on camel rearing for their main livelihood, it seems likely that the
wells were developed primarily as a means of watering the camels, rather
than for agriculture. This ecological situation is quite different from the re?
mainder of the area.
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Until this century, therefore, there was no settled agriculture in the depres?
sion, and the region controlled by the sarddr exhibited no class differentiation

except for the limited use of gholam. Since the qanat were constructed, a
class distinction has arisen between gholam and sharecroppers, the econom?
ically independent baluch, and the landowning and ruling Nawabi. The
Nawabi have sold their herds and have intermarried with the (non-Baluch)
landowners in the Narmashir region to the northwest, but they still build no
permanent dwellings.
Obviously the Nawabi today are in a social and political position equiva?
lent to that of the ha\omzat in the remainder of the area, and the sarddr of
the Bameri is comparable to a ha\om elsewhere. But he is not accorded the
status or the title formally. This is not surprising, for the term is now after
all an anachronism. It would, for instance, be illegal for him to attempt to
collect dah-ya\ or mdliydt (though the more informal collections formerly al?
lowed to sarddr are still sometimes made despite their illegality). Similarly,
it is understandable that the ha\omzat in the remainder of the area are not
quick to recognize a new member to their class. In the case of the Sardarzai,
such recognition was forced on the hd\omzdt by military defeat, which also
brought about intermarriage. Nevertheless, I have on one occasion heard
the present sarddr addressed as hd\om by a Bameri sharecropper. Further?
more, the Barakzai hdkpmzdt to the east have given a wife to the Nawabi.
The mother of this woman was not ha\omzdt, and so the woman herself,
though Barakzai, did not have ha\omzdt class status, but the marriage is
nevertheless significant in the present context.

Another geographical factor has been operative in this case. The whole of
Baluchistan, in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as in Persia, has tended his?
torically to form a cul de sac. It is for the most part surrounded by desert on

one side and an inhospitable coast on the other. The fact that it has never
supported a large city, coupled with its general isolation, has meant that it

has always been difficult to control, and that routes through it have seldom
been secure. Until the 1930s the main route of access to the area for Persian
government officials lay through the Jaz Murian depression, and the Persians
always used a fort at the eastern end of the depression as their administrative

center, when they could hold it. This meant that the Bameri, and particu?
larly their leading family, the Nawabi, who controlled the route, were more
exposed to contact and more open to influence from the rest of Persia than

was the remainder of the area, and this probably helps to account for the

construction of the qanat at the beginning of the present century. A few dec?

ades after the construction of the qanat the new Pahlavi regime in Teheran
(1925- ) sought to consolidate its position in the area by building a new
provincial city at a site some 400 kilometers to the north. This resulted in the
diversion of all through traffic away from the depression, and no motor road
has yet been built through it. This has produced the paradox, that while the
greater part of Persian Baluchistan has become progressively less isolated
particularly during the last decade, the Jaz Murian depression and its inhab?
itants the Bameri have suffered a net increase in isolation. This has allowed
the Nawabi to take full advantage of the change in their situation at a time
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when hd\om in the remainder of the area were being shorn of their privi?
leges by the encroaching Persian administration. This is but one of many
instances on the Iranian plateau of the effect that the choice of routes for
motor roads, among other aspects of policies of modernization, may have on
traditional balances of power and economic prosperity.
Historical Reconstruction and a Model

Baluch cultural values are basically nomadic pastoral values. A rich

pus of poetry exists in the Baluchi language which gives expression to t

values. It is assumed that the people who brought the name Baluch

area also brought the language. They were certainly pastoralists. There

means of telling whether their descendants are among the present

tants of the area. The historical information which can be gleaned from
poetry belongs to a much later period.

The present population of the area may be conveniently divided i

the tribes who think they have always been there or profess not to know

origin, (2) those who claim to be by origin Arabs descended from H

the paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, and to have fought besid

grandson Husein at Karbala before migrating eastwards (though th
not Shi'a), and (3) those who claim a much more recent, and more l
origin in Persia, Afghanistan, eastern Arabia, or the Indian subcon

Attention has already been drawn to the alien origin of most of the Ba

terms introduced above. We may surmise that they were assimilated
because they were prestigious (e.g., ha\om), or because they were b

into the society by high-status immigrants. Both oral tradition and suc

ten historical evidence as exists indicate that the society has consta

similated immigrant groups, and that they have often entered the area
high status. It is to be expected that the assimilation of alien groups in
ruling class would bring with it new political concepts.

The model which is constructed below?which is similar to that exp

by Ibn Khaldun with reference to Islamic history up to the fourteenth
tury?is an attempt to complete the picture by suggesting the dynamic
tionship between the two basic modes of livelihood, the two poles of po

organization and kin behavior, and the various types of environmen

For reasons which concern their area of origin, a tribal, pastoral grou

people invades a settled, agricultural area. They include a nuclear
which claims patrilineal descent from a common ancestor and rec

within itself a dominant line or family, which, however, can only reta

position so long as it "earns" it by the quality of its leadership. Fin

power vacuum, owing to the weakness of the political structure and aut

ity in the settled area it invades, it stays there and becomes the do
power in the area. The leading family of the invaders becomes the f

power in the settled area, and therefore the de facto rulers of both peo

those that entered the area with it?the pastoralists?and those who
the area when it came?the peasants. There may of course be more t
such family, in which case the area becomes divided into their res
areas of influence and political control.
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Having become the focus of a more numerous and more diversified peo?
ple, the leading family also increases in power and wealth, for it now has the

use of agricultural as well as pastoral resources. The tribal following, how?
ever, does not become either more powerful or richer, since its social position
has basically not changed; it follows the same way of life and feels the same
relationship with its leading family as before. On the other hand, the settled

people are now subordinate to the leading family of the invaders, and the
structural distance between them and their new rulers is much greater than

that which prevailed between the leading family and its tribal following.
Finally, the direct relationship between the settled and the tribal people is not
defined.

Before the invasion the settled people are unlikely to have had the same
close relationship with their political leaders as the tribal following had with

its dominant line. Being divided among a number of small villages over a
large area, they are likely to have been politically subject to a "superstructure"
of some kind, whether in the form of one single dominant "dynastic" family
or of an oligarchy of several interrelated families (cf. Parsons 1964: 162-163;

Spooner 1965: 23). In either case, the structural distance between the set?

tled people and its rulers is likely to have been greater than that between the

pastoralists and their leaders. In the new situation, therefore, as far as the

settled people are concerned one superstructure is simply substituted for an?
other, making little or no real difference to the social and political position
of the great majority of them. The leaders who constituted their former su?

perstructure will have been either killed, driven out, or assimilated with

them. In the latter case, some of them may assume the role of popular leaders
of their former people under the new superstructure. This is not so for the

tribal following. For them the first main result of the new situation is to
enhance their pride through contact with another stratum of people who are
socially inferior to them (a) by occupation, for pastoral values are dominant,
and (b) by structural distance from the rulers.
However, such a situation cannot be static, for it has enhanced the political
and economic position of the leaders more than that of the following, with

the result that the original tribal organization and the "group feeling" (cf.
Ibn Khaldun 1958: passim) of the tribe is disturbed. The structural distance
between the leading family and its tribal following automatically increases
because of the change in the economic and political basis of that relationship.

And the leading family tends to become "dynastic." Whatever may have

been the situation before the invasion, the new composite population of the
area is potentially divided into three social categories or classes: the dynastic

family, the nomadic pastoralists, and the settled peasants. The relationship

between the first and last of these is politically stable, but the relationships
between the second and each of the other two tend to be unstable since
neither is properly defined politically nor firmly based economically.
In the new situation the settled people are a source of agricultural wealth

and labor for the dynastic family, while the tribal following is a source of

military strength and, secondarily, of pastoral products. At first, the tribal fol?
lowing is by far the more important to the dynastic family because the latter
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stands in need of it as a source of strength to consolidate its position. But as
its position becomes firmer, it looks more and more to the settled population
as its main source of wealth.

Growing interest in settled agriculture, and therefore also in the settled
agricultural people, causes the dynastic family next to change its military
outlook. Whereas before it had fought for and defended movable property
only, it is now interested in defending immovable plots of cultivable land
and crops and peasants. With this in mind it begins to feel the nakedness
and insecurity of nomad life and starts to build forts, or take over and de?
velop existing ones, for its protection and defense in the main agricultural
centers. It takes some time before the dynastic family becomes actually set?
tled, but the forts are a tangible symbol for all three classes of the growing
ties between the dynastic family and the settled people.
Tribal Nomenclature and Identity

The model is capable of being developed further up to a cyclical st
re-invasion (cf. Ibn Khaldun), with modifications to account for th
types of social change resulting from the intervention of the natio
modernizing state machine. However, such further development is n

quired in connection with the argument of the present paper, and is lef
future publication. The remainder of this section discusses certain quest
of tribal nomenclature and identity, and is parallel to the model.

Before arriving in the area the tribal people will have had a

either the original name of the agnatic nuclear group applied por ex
to the dynastic family or the original name of an eponymous ancestor o
dynastic family line applied by the tribal following to themselves, thus
tinguishing them from other peoples by a name denoting their gro
giance. In either case this name is now gradually becoming applied
settled people as well as the tribal following, i.e., in effect to the realm
dynastic family. In short, the political unit takes its name from its dom
element, and the remainder of the population loses its ethnic or cu

identity, and thereby becomes fully assimilated.
Such is the case with regard to the situation within the society. The e
situation, however, is somewhat different. The Persian Baluch are a poli
community to the extent that traditionally no tribe or group allowed t

selves to become subordinated to non-Baluch. The concept of politica

under one (Baluch) leader has probably never had any general v
among them. What, then, is a Baluch? The simplest definition is
Baluch is a man who calls himself "Baluch," since only the Baluch ar
of being Baluch. We can only improve on this by introducing the fo
hypothesis, which, though it is probably not susceptible of proof, t

count of the available evidence and throws some light on the situation u

discussion.

The origin and etymology of the word "Baluch" are unknown.7 A
the Baluch today it is used, as we have already seen, simply to mean

dwelling pastoralist." It is significant that it is used with the same mea

Persian in northeastern Persia. The words \urd and lur are reporte
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similarly used among the Kurds and Lurs respectively, and similar usage of
the word arab is also found among the Arabs. In some other parts of the
Iranian world pairs of terms are found which are used to distinguish no?
madic from settled people within a given area irrespective of ethnic or other
factors. Such terms are often treated as though they have purely ethnic sig?
nificance. The hypothesis I wish to suggest is that such words in general, and
"Baluch" in particular, are in origin (so far as sociological rather than philological origin is concerned) terms adopted by settled populations to refer to
bands of nomadic pastoralists who roamed the uncultivated land in their vi?
cinity, regardless of their supposed racial origin or the language they spoke.
As such "Baluch" would be a blanket "supra-tribal" term with associations of
the town's fear and contempt of the wilderness. Because of the acknowledged
cultural and religious superiority of the towns, it was natural for the nomads
to accept the name (though without the associations) by which the townspeople designated them, thus unconsciously assimilating themselves to the
town's conception of them. The nomads may also have their own term of
contempt for the townspeople; for instance, for nontribal Persians Baluchi
uses gajar, from the name of the last Persian dynasty. However, the towns?
people would only assimilate themselves to the tribal conception of them if a
tribal invasion were to conquer the towns and give rise to a tribal ruling class,

as we have shown above.

Baluch society has retained a large percentage of nonnomads8 without los-

ing the pastoral emphasis in its system of values. There is evidence to sug?
gest that at an earlier stage in the development of the society the peasants
were in a situation similar to helots. All the major agricultural centers of the

area bear names which we know have remained unchanged since a time

well before any people called Baluch arrived in the area. All other toponymy

is predominantly Baluchi, and the exceptions are Persian and easily ex?

plained (cf. Spooner 1969). The pastoral invaders were interested in control?

ling the land and enjoying its produce, not in owning it. Even today land
ownership is irrelevant to social status. There are several cases where the
largest landowners (apart from the hd\om) have a very low social status but

a tribal name which means something like "chief." Such a situation is very
difficult to explain unless such people do in fact represent the remnants of a

previous agricultural population. They are now all fully assimilated as equal
members of the society?as Baluch, though not as baluch. All named tribal
groups in the Iranian cultural area (e.g., Bakhtiari, Qashqai, and Turkoman)
include nonnomads, and it is natural that a term should be required to differ-

entiate between nomadic and nonnomadic within the named group, what?

ever the origin of the latter. As we have seen, the same term is used in many
cases for the nomadic as for the whole tribal group, and another is found for

the nonnomads within it. In general, therefore, given the special ecological

and historical factors of the Iranian cultural area, it would seem that within a
given area the townspeople name the tribal group, whereas within the tribal

group the nomads name the nonnomads. At each step the names are ac?

cepted with a certain degree of cultural inferiority.

The shift to cognatic principles of kinship, marriage, and inheritance
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helped to unify and fuse the two elements of the new society, the peasants
and the pastoral immigrants. The horizontal network of cognatic intermarriage spread through most of the area, providing political alliance and agri?
cultural security by the dispersal of landowning interests through two or
more ecological regions. Only in two regions which remained almost en?
tirely pastoral?the Jaz Murian, discussed above, and the Sarhadd in the
north of the area?was there little or no conversion from agnatic principles.
The nomadic pastoralists of these two regions retained their independence
from the agricultural hd\om by keeping themselves apart, rather than by
superior strength. An endogamous, agnatic system of marriage and inheri?
tance insured their independence, whereas the only use that the originally
patrilineal ha\om retained for their agnatic genealogy was as a symbolic
justification of their legitimacy.
NOTES

i. Between 1963 and 1967 I spent some fourteen months in Persian Baluchis

most of the remainder of the time in Tehran in touch with informants. I take
opportunity of expressing my gratitude to St. Antony's College, Oxford, the
Academy, and the British Institute of Persian Studies for the financial and ot

sistance which made this possible, and to Dr. Rodney Needham for his g

guidance and encouragement.
2. Used in this sense the term is italicized with a small initial letter througho
distinction between Baluch and baluch is discussed in the final section. Briefly,
Baluch in a context which includes non-Baluch; within Baluch society the term
this particular class.

3. This status was legally abolished when the administration of the area was f
taken over by the central government in 1928. The only practical difference th
at the time was to enable them to leave Baluch society if they wished. Those th
remain are almost exclusively black and/or Negroid, and an effective color ba
it difficult for them to improve their status either within the area or elsewhere.

1928 they were used as either domestic servants, agricultural serfs, or mili
chiefs can no longer keep a militia, and they can no longer support many d

servants. Apart from those who have moved to Karachi or the other side of the
Gulf as coolie laborers, many have been settled by their owners on part of thei
often on a sharecropping basis.
4. With regard to inheritance it should be mentioned that the Baluch are Sunni M

of the Hanafi rite, and that according to Islamic law a daughter should rece
the share of a son, while certain provisions are also made for other relatives. T
a few small communities in the area, invariably with especial claims to reli
which keep strictly to these precepts. Inheritance practices also differ accordin

type of property, but this will be dealt with in another publication.

5. To avoid confusion it should be noted that the general use of the term sard
side the area under discussion, in both Baluchi and Persian, is to denote abs
paramount tribal chiefs, similar to those here called ha\om.
6. A good account is given in Wulff (1966: 249). Briefly, a qanat is an under
channel constructed to connect a reliable aquifer with cultivable land lower

valley.

7. According to the general consensus of opinion the name "Baluch" and the Baluchi
language were brought into the area from the northwest in the eleventh century,
though the evidence is scanty. Most of what is now called Baluchistan probably did not
become uniformly Baluch or Baluchi-speaking until much later. Practically nothing is
known of what was displaced.
8. There are no figures. The proportion has probably varied constantly, since adverse
circumstances, such as drought, tended to affect the baluch and drive them into tem-
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porary or permanent exile before the shahri. The proportion of peasants to nomads is
now probably more than half and increasing because of the bias of government develop?
ment programs.
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